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ABSTRACT: Concerning the versions of the Tenseless Theory of Time, the Old B-theory 
has two: the Date-analysis version and the Token-reflexive version, while the 
New B-theory has three: the Date-analysis, the Token-reflexive and the Sentence-
type versions. Each of these five versions of the B-theory has received serious 
attacks from the A-theorists, some of whom even claim that the tenseless theory 
“though still widely held, is a theory in retreat” (Craig 1996), and that “if Quentin 
Smith (1993) delivered the mortal blow to the New B-Theory of Language then 
Laurie Paul (1997) has written its obituary” (Craig 1999). In this paper, by mak-
ing more precise some key notions involved in the formulation of a tenseless 
theory – in particular, two notions of truth conditions, two notions of meaning 
and two notions of translation are distinguished – I have come up with a single 
B-thesis for the B-theory. When charitably interpreted, the two versions of the 
old theory and the three versions of the new theory can all be regarded as special 
ways of presenting the same B-thesis, and the various A-attacks raised against 
these versions can then be resolved in a systematic way.
KEY WORDS: B-theory of time, ch-meaning, cn-meaning, pt-truth-condition, pw-truth-
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1. Introduction
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, there has been an ongo-
ing debate between the proponents of the A-theory (tensed theory) of time 
and those of the B-theory (tenseless theory) of time. The former typically 
hold that pastness, presentness and futurity are real properties of events 
and that a mind-independent Now moves from the past towards the future; 
the latter maintain that what we have is a static time, one in which events 
are merely related by relations such as earlier than, later than or simulta-
neous with. While this is presumably an ontological debate, it seems that 
nearly all philosophers of time in the analytic tradition are concerned with 
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the relevant semantic issues. Thus while the old B-theory holds the naïve 
view that tensed sentences can be translated into tenseless sentences, and 
hence eliminated from natural language, the new B-theory, while conced-
ing that such direct translatability would not be possible, maintains that 
the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be described in terms of B-re-
lations. Still, both the tensed and tenseless theorists assume that ontologi-
cal conclusions can be drawn from semantic considerations.1 This would 
imply, among other things, that if B-series relations alone are sufficient 
for a complete description of time, then the A-series ontology should be 
abandoned. “Tensed sentence analysis” has therefore become a recurring 
theme in the philosophy of time: while the A-theorist tries to establish an 
A-ontology through the irreplaceability of tensed sentences, the B-theorist 
claims that tensed sentences can either be translated by tenseless ones (the 
old theory), or be given tenseless truth conditions (the new theory).
In the literature, we find diverse A- and B-positions in this ongoing 
debate. The A-theorists attack B-positions and the B-theorists fire back, 
and the B-theorists also disagree among themselves as to which version 
of the B-theory truly holds. While some A-theorists claim that the new 
B-theory of time is a theory in retreat, cf. Craig (1996), and some B-theo-
rists reply that these A-theorists have raised irrelevant objections to their 
position (cf. Oaklander 1991, 2003), other B-theorists admit that certain 
versions of the B-theory cannot really stand. For instance, Mellor (1998) 
admits that the token-reflexive account which he defends in Real Time is 
problematic; Dyke, on the other hand, while embracing the token-reflex-
ive version, admits (see Dyke 2002) that the date-analysis version Mellor 
subsequently adopts in Real Time II is unsatisfactory; Paul regards both 
the token-reflexive and date-analysis versions of the B-theory as being 
incapable of withstanding the attacks from the A-theorist Smith, and goes 
on to propose her sentence-type version of the theory (Paul 1997).2
Finally, Oaklander (2003) observes that in this debate, at least four 
notions of truth condition and four notions of meaning may be found. I 
agree with Oaklander that the failure to distinguish different notions of 
truth condition and meaning is partly, if not wholly, responsible for the 
generation of these numerous positions. Therefore, I feel that we first need 
to make as clear and precise as possible all of the key concepts involved 
in this debate. In this paper, I shall start with providing definitions for two 
distinct notions of truth condition.3 Each notion of truth condition is then 
1 In this paper, I will accept this controversial position uncritically.
2 Oaklander (2003) even proposes a “newer” version of the B-theory.
3 It is worth noting that Torre (2009) distinguishes “conditions for the truth of tensed-
tokens” and “conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens”, and 
provides three formulations for both the date-version and the token-version, depending 
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associated with a particular notion of meaning, and each notion of mean-
ing is subsequently associated with a particular notion of translation. In 
terms of these concepts of truth condition, meaning and translation, I shall 
then outline a unified B-theory of time. Given certain presuppositions and 
depending on the way we look at it or understand it, this theory may be 
seen to fit any of the five existing versions of the B-theory of time.
Section 2 of the paper will be devoted to the definitions of truth con-
dition, meaning and translation. In Section 3, I present a unified B-theory 
of time in terms of the notions defined in Section 2, and then in sections 
3.1–3.5 I charitably re-interpret the five existing versions of the B-theory 
and fit them into the framework of my unified B-thesis. Furthermore, I 
offer, from the viewpoint of this unified account, systematic replies to the 
A-attacks with regard to each of the five versions of the B-theory. In Dyke 
(2002) and Oaklander (2003) we can find replies to some of the A-attacks 
on the new token-reflexive B-theory that may seem congruent to my own 
replies.
2. Truth-Condition, Meaning and Translation
For the past few decades, the debate between the A-theory and the B-
theory has centered around the issue of making sense of tensed sentences 
with tenseless facts. The old B-theory holds the naïve view that, for every 
tensed sentence, one can find a tenseless sentence that has the same mean-
ing as the former, thus translating the former, rendering the “tensed reality” 
proposed by the A-theory a sheer illusion. However, as the old B-theory 
did not seem to be able to stand up to the attacks of A-theorists, B-theorists 
came up with a “new B-theory of time”: this concedes that tensed sen-
tences indeed cannot be translated into tenseless ones, yet claims that the 
truth condition of a tensed sentence can be stated in terms of a tenseless 
sentence. However, it turns out that the three versions of the new B-theory 
do not seem to fare any better, as each of them has still proved vulnerable 
to the attacks of the A-theorists.
My own claim is that if we can, by always distinguishing between 
possible worlds and possible tokens, and between sentence tokens and 
sentence types, make the notions of truth condition, meaning and transla-
tion precise, then there is no need to abandon any version of the B-theory. 
on what one takes the truth-bearers to be. Our treatment is different from his in that i) 
propositions are not admitted into our ontology in the first place, ii) the m-truth-condition 
that Torre dismisses in his paper – according to him, “The New B-theorist should claim 
that neither the token-reflexive theory nor the date theory are in the business of providing 
m-truth-conditions” – will play an important role in our discussion here.
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What we need is a set of well-defined words/phrases that allows us to 
articulate a precise and unified B-thesis, one which incorporates all five of 
the presently-existing versions of the B-theory. In Section 3, the five ver-
sions of the B-theory will be re-interpreted as special ways of presenting 
the same B-thesis.
Now, in subsection 2.1, I shall distinguish two notions of truth condi-
tion and then, based on these, distinguish two notions of meaning and two 
notions of translation in subsections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
2.1 Two Notions of Truth-Condition
The pw-truth-condition
Let us begin with the simplest model of how language works: a sentence 
token is uttered, a world is called upon, and then a truth-value is obtained. 
In other words, the pairing of two entities, namely a sentence token and a 
world under consideration, yields a truth-value. However, in reality, given 
a sentence token that is uttered in the real world, we are already presup-
posing this world when we have the token, and hence the truth value of 
the token is fixed once and for all. As a result, the dependency of the truth 
value on the state of the world cannot be readily studied. What are we to 
do about this?
Observe that given a sentence token that is uttered in the world, we 
may not know the details about the world, hence the truth-value of the 
token may not be available to us. For instance, let u be the token “Paul 
Tillich’s birthday is August 20”, uttered by me as I type this sentence. Even 
though u indeed has a fixed truth-value, this value may not be known to 
us.4 In order to pin down the truth value, we will have to see what the “cir-
cumstances of evaluation” – the state of the world in its relevant respects5 
– actually are. However, if we are only concerned with grasping the mean-
ing of a sentence token, then we do not need to know the actual state of 
the world in order to pin down its ultimate truth value. It suffices to know 
the token’s truth condition – defined as a function that relates the possible 
states of the world to the corresponding truth values of the sentence token. 
And this truth condition precisely states the dependency of the truth value 
of a sentence token on the state of the world in which it is uttered.
4 In principle, one can claim that whenever a sentence is uttered, its truth value is 
“fixed”. But, in practice, this claim is somehow vacuous, as we could just as well assert 
that your future is “fixed” because the world will be what it will be.
5 Here I borrow the words of Wright (2007). What concerns us is the state of the 
world in all respects. The primary concern of that paper, however, is the role the context of 
assessment can play in determining the truth of an utterance.
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I shall abbreviate a “possible state of the world” as a “possible world” 
in order to conform with other authors’ preference for the latter term. 
Note that according to this definition, a “possible world” is by no means a 
“world” but rather a “possible state” of the world.6 Indeed, we have only 
one world, i.e. the real world, but we can, given our ignorance of the actual 
state of this world, envisage various possible states of it. As a result, we 
can talk about the truth of the token u with respect to a possible world w. I 
shall call this sort of condition the pw-truth-condition of the token, where 
the “pw” here is shorthand for “possible-world”. A typical pw-truth-condi-
tion takes the following form:
Let u be a specific token of “Paul Tillich’s birthday is August 20” 
uttered in the real world. For every possible world w in which u is 
uttered,7 the token u is true in w if and only if Paul Tillich’s birthday 
is August 20 in w.
Indeed, for the word “condition” to make sense there has to be something 
pending, and in the present case it is this “state of the world” that is there 
for us to find out – for knowing that we are in the world does not, in itself, 
tell us what the state of our world is. Therefore, various possible worlds, 
i.e. possible states of the world, are introduced into the picture to help us 
state the truth condition for u.
The pt-truth-condition
Now if, instead of being given a specific token uttered in the real world, 
we are considering an unspecified token of a sentence type, then even if 
we know everything about the world we may still not know the truth-value 
of the token, as we have no idea in what context it is to be uttered. Thus in 
order for a possible token to be finally associated with a truth-value, i.e. to 
pin down the truth-value of the token, we need to know both the context of 
the token and the state of the world. In this case we may speak of a possi-
ble-token truth-condition, or simply a pt-truth-condition, which typically 
takes the following form:
For any possible token u of the sentence type “Paul Tillich died 45 
years ago”, the token u is true if and only if the death of Paul Tillich 
is 45 years before the time of u.
6 The philosophical implications of this definition remain to be explored elsewhere.
7 And, for simplicity’s sake, we shall merely say that u is uttered in the possible 
world w, rather than that w is a possible state of the world such that u is uttered in the 
world. In any case, there is no point in worrying about whether the token u is a so-called 
“transworld-identity”, as we here have only one world and one token, and the token u is 
uttered in the world.
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Note that while there is no mention of the world in this statement, 
we should bear in mind that, as before, possible states of the world play a 
significant role here. A pt-truth-condition here is in fact associated with a 
function from possible tokens to pw-truth-conditions, where the latter are 
in turn associated with functions from possible worlds to truth-values.8
With the exception of Laurie Paul, who (see Paul 1997) is concerned 
with the truth condition of a sentence type, most philosophers of time talk 
about the truth condition of a sentence token.9 Now, by a truth condition 
they can either mean a pw-truth-condition or a pt-truth-condition. If they 
are concerned with a specific token uttered in a particular context, then 
they are interested in a pw-truth-condition. If they are, on the other hand, 
concerned that the truth-value of a token u be dependent on the context 
of its tokening, i.e. on where, when, and by whom it is uttered, then what 
they are thinking about is not an actual token u but a possible token u 
(i.e. “u” as a token variable) of the type U to which u belongs. And the 
truth-condition in question is then the pt-truth-condition for a token of a 
sentence type, one which can be prescribed via the specification of a truth-
value for each possible token u of that type and for each possible world in 
which u is uttered.
To get a firmer grasp of the distinction between these two types of 
truth-condition, we can compare the notion of truth condition with the no-
tion of “the condition of being a bachelor”. The subject of the former is a 
sentence token and the subject of the latter is a person. While we may, on 
some occasions, talk about the condition of being a bachelor for a person, 
we may, on others, talk about the condition of being a bachelor for Joe. 
How are we to make sense of these conditions?
According to Kemp (1998: 485):
if we ask under what condition an arbitrary x is a bachelor, we ask for an 
explanation of the concept or property x is a bachelor, the sense of “x is a 
bachelor”; but if we ask for the condition under which some particular Joe is 
a bachelor, then clearly the condition is that Joe be an unmarried man.10
Note however that “x is a bachelor” is not a well-formed sentence in itself, 
and the condition for an arbitrary x to be a bachelor is better thought of 
as being governed by “for any x, x is a bachelor iff it belongs to the set 
B”, where B is the extension of bachelor which can be suitably specified. 
“Joe is a bachelor”, on the other hand, is a well-formed sentence and it is 
 8 If the state of the world is known, then to get the truth of a possible token we would 
only need to know the context of its tokening.
 9 See for instance the articles in Oaklander and Smith (1994).
10 Kemp actually identifies the truth condition of “Joe is a bachelor” with the proposi-
tion expressed by it.
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concerned with the world rather than a set of individuals within it. The 
“condition of being a bachelor” for Joe is simply Joe’s being a bachelor. 
And immediately this raises the issue of Joe’s being a bachelor in differ-
ent possible worlds – possible outcomes of our investigation – despite the 
fact that, in the actual world, whether or not John is a bachelor has a fixed 
truth-value already.
Our notion of the pw-truth-condition of a token constant is analogous 
to that of “Joe is a bachelor”, while the pt-truth-condition of a token vari-




 is true iff … 1(ii) A token u of U is true iff …
2(i) Joe is a bachelor iff … 2(ii) A person x is a bachelor iff …
The underlined clauses of 1(i) and 2(i) are both about the world, and 
we need to have a possible world at hand in order to decide whether their 
respective conditions are fulfilled. The underlined clauses of 1(ii) and 2(ii) 
are, in contrast, not well-formed sentences. Nonetheless, if u and x are as-
sumed to be universally quantified, then 1(ii) and 2(ii) allow us to decide 
whether, given a possible world w and a possible instantiation of the vari-
ables u or x, the respective clauses hold in w.
Therefore, conditions of the form “A token u of U is so and so iff …” 
and “A person x is so and so iff …” are actually concerned with the sen-
tence type U and the personhood itself, rather than with a particular token 
and a particular person respectively. To be more specific, the pt-truth-con-
dition of a token u is concerned with the type U of which u is a token, 
rather than the token u itself. Thus, by abusing notation, we may as well 
talk about the “pt-truth-condition” of a sentence type.
The pt-truth-condition of a sentence type U can be made more con-
crete by the following statement:
(PTTC) A token u
I
 of U uttered in a context I is true if and only if w
I
 
 I(U), where w
I
 is the world in which u
I
 is uttered, and I(U) 
is the set of possible worlds determined by the sense of U 
and the context I.11
As the statement takes the form “A token u
I
 … is true if and only if …”, 
inevitably some philosophers of time would get the following wrong im-
11 Note that I have assumed that the context I itself determines a unique possible 
world w
I
. A more general statement should be of the following form: A token u
I
 of U ut-
tered in a context I is true in a possible world w if and only if w  I(U), where I(U) is the 
set of possible worlds determined by the sense of U and the context I.
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pressions: i) the truth condition under consideration is about a specific 
sentence token u
I
 ; and ii) there are two clauses here joined by the con-
nective “if and only if”, one declaring the truth of the token u
I
 while the 
other prescribes the truth condition of u
I
. The point to note here, however, 
is that in the statement (PTTC), the term “I” plays is the role of a variable 
rather than that of a proper name, and consequently, unless the context I is 




” refer to specific entities, 
the clause on the left hand side of “if and only if” and the clause on the 
right are not well-formed sentences at all.
2.2 Two Notions of Meaning
Meaning is a complicated issue and one which creates many problems 
for philosophers, yet ideally a theory of time should be supported by a 
well-established, comprehensive theory of meaning. Given that the latter 
theory is not available presently, we can only proceed with the sketch of 
a minimalist theory of meaning. More precisely, we shall be content with 
the stipulation of two basic notions of meaning that allow us to get on with 
the analysis of tensed sentences.12 For precision and simplicity we shall 
stick to the following principles: 1) the only meaning-bearers are sentence 
tokens and sentence types; 2) the meaning of a sentence token is exhausted 
by its truth condition; 3) the meaning of a sentence type is exhausted by 
the truth condition of its possible tokens. We then distinguish between the 
following two notions of meaning:
The cn-meaning of a token
The content-meaning13 of a token u, or in short the cn-meaning of it, is the 
thing we grasp when we get hold of its pw-truth-condition. In other words, 
the meaning of a token is exhausted by its pw-truth-condition. In Fregean 
terms, the referent of a token u is its truth-value, and in that case the pw-
truth-condition of u can be thought of as an incomplete truth-value, in the 
sense that one still has to know the state of the world – what the world 
actually is – in order to get the truth-value.
The ch-meaning of a type
The character-meaning, or the ch-meaning for short, of a sentence type 
is the thing we grasp when we get hold of its pt-truth-condition. Clearly, 
while the cn-meaning of a token corresponds to a content (what is said) 
in Kaplan’s terms, the ch-meaning of a type thus defined is associated 
12 In particular, we are concerned with sentential meanings only, leaving lexical 
meanings completely untouched.
13 See Kaplan (1989) for the definition of content and character.
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with Kaplan’s character (that which determines the content in varying 
contexts).14 Again, a ch-meaning can be thought of as an incomplete cn-
meaning, in the sense that one still has to know the context in which the 
type is to be tokened in order to get the cn-meaning.
Note that as we are taking a realistic view of language, the “meaning” 
of a sentence type can only be described through the truth-values of its 
tokens. Entities such as “the truth-value of There is no token now in a pre-
historic era” or “the proposition expressed by I am not uttering anything 
now” make no sense, as there is no indication as to how the italicized parts 
are to be uttered.
We now look at two usages of the term “meaning” in the literature 
of the philosophy of time, and see how they can be clarified in our terms. 
Firstly, some authors claim that different tokens of a sentence type can 
mean different things. For example, a token of the sentence type “It’s 
Tuesday” uttered on July 7 means that July 7 is Tuesday, while a token of 
“It’s Tuesday” uttered on July 8 means that July 8 is Tuesday. What they 
are doing here is, in our terms, associating two different pw-truth-condi-
tions with the two distinct tokens and thus giving them different cn-mean-
ings. The extensions of these two cn-meanings are simply two different 
sets of possible worlds.
Secondly, the slogan that the meaning of a sentence consists in its 
truth condition is regarded by many as unacceptable, because most people 
are convinced that the meaning of a sentence is more than its truth condi-
tion. As a typical example, Dyke (2003: 80) claims that
Tensed meaning reveals itself when we compare a tensed sentence token 
with a token of the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. For any 
pair of sentences like this, we can see that they do not mean the same thing. 
So tensed meaning does not reside in the truth condition of tensed sentences. 
What we can conclude from this is that there is more to meaning than to truth 
conditions. [The italics are mine.]
Clearly, some tidying-up of terms needs to be done here. It is not dif-
ficult to see that the truth condition Dyke has in mind here is the pw-truth-
condition of a token, while the meaning she has in mind is the ch-meaning 
of a type. So there is no point in claiming, as she does, that “there is more 
to meaning than to truth conditions” – the pw-truth-condition is associated 
with a particular token of a sentence type, yet the ch-meaning is associ-
ated with the sentence type itself. What needs to be emphasized here is 
14 It is important to note that when the ch-meaning of a sentence type is under consid-
eration, a token of the type actually ranges over all contexts of all possible worlds. That is, 
on one level we should choose a possible world for the type to be tokened, and on another 
we should locate a context in that possible world for the utterance of the token.
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this: the cn-meaning of a sentence token is completely determined by its 
pw-truth-condition, while the ch-meaning of a sentence type is completely 
prescribed by its pt-truth-condition.
2.3 Two Notions of Translation
“Translation” is a term which features heavily in the debate between the 
A-theorist and the B-theorist. According to Dr. Johnson, to translate is “to 
change into another language, retaining the sense”. To capture the spirit 
of Dr. Johnson, assuming that his “sense” is synonymous with “meaning”, 
it is natural to define translation in terms of the sameness of meanings. 
Based on the results of the previous subsections, we come up with the fol-
lowing two notions of translation:15
The tk-translation of tokens
Two sentence tokens are said to tk-translate each other provided that they 
have the same cn-meaning.
The tp-translation of types
Two sentence types are said to tp-translate each other if they have the same 
ch-meaning.16
To summarize, we have
(#) Sentence tokens a and b tk-translate each other 
iff a and b have the same cn-meaning 
iff a and b have the same pw-truth-condition.
(†) Setence-types A and B tp-translate each other 
iff A and B have the same ch-meaning 
iff A and B have the same pt-truth-condition.17
Early philosophers of time used to say that “A token of ‘John is hungry 
now’ uttered at t can be translated by a token of ‘John is hungry at t’”, based 
on the conviction that these two tokens have the same “truth condition”. 
But later they conceded that they were mistaken: the translation did not 
work – the “truth condition” of the token of “John is hungry now” uttered 
15 Some philosophers talk about the translation of “sentences and their tokens” as 
if one notion of translation works for both types and tokens at the same time, cf. Smith 
(1993). But I believe it is not so.




 have the same ch-





17 By “A and B have the same pt-truth-condition”, I mean that possible tokens of A 
have the same pt-truth-condition as possible tokens of B, or more specifically, any given 
token of A has the same pw-truth-condition as a token of B uttered in the same context.
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at t and the “truth condition” of the token of “John is hungry at t” are dif-
ferent, because the truth of the former is context-dependent while the truth 
of the latter is not. Apparently, a confusion between a pw-truth-condition 
and a pt-truth-condition is involved here. As I have already emphasized: 
i) If they are actually considering the pw-truth-condition of a sentence to-
ken, then how the context of a token may affect its truth value should not 
concern them: the two tokens do have the same pw-truth-condition and the 
same cn-meaning, and they do tk-translate each other, and that’s all. ii) If 
they, on the other hand, do worry that the two tokens may not “mean” the 
same thing, because the truth-value (or, in our terms, the pw-truth-condi-
tion) of a tensed token is dependent on the time of utterance, while that of 
a tenseless token is not, then they are actually concerned with the pt-truth-
conditions of two sentence types18 and their pt-truth-conditions are indeed 
different. But then the fact that the two original tokens happen to have the 
same pw-truth-condition should not concern them at all.
In “The Theory of Translation”, William Haas (1962: 208) makes the 
following remark:
At first sight, this is what we are tempted to make of translation – an opera-
tion with three terms: two expressions, and a meaning they share. When we 
translate, then, we seem to establish a relation of three distinct entities, each 
separately apprehended: the two expressions seen on paper or heard in the 
air, and the meaning in the translator’s mind. The meaning, presumably, we 
“retain” and translate; we “transfer” it from one expression to the other.
Evidently, what Haas has in mind here is the tk-translation of sentence 
tokens, and what is relevant to the translatability here is the sameness of 
the pw-truth-condition of two tokens. However, we can also consider the 
tp-translation of sentence types, as described in (†). For in this case, the 
pt-truth-condition of a sentence type can be explicitly prescribed by the 
(PTTC) of subsection 2.1, and the translatability between two sentence 
types is governed by the sameness of their pt-truth-conditions.
The following example illustrates the key difference between these 
two notions of translation. The guest speaker Johannes, with his English 
interpreter John standing besides him, utters the German token “Mir ist 
kalt”19 in some context I. How should John translate the token? Should 
he opt for “He is cold”, insisting that the original token and the token that 
translates it should have the same truth-value (or, in our terms, the same 
18 After all, once the token is allowed to change its context, then we are concerned 
with “an arbitrary token of the type to which the original token belongs” rather than with 
“the token”. In other words, our focus has shifted from a token to a type, and we are pre-
scribing the ch-meaning of a sentence type through the employment of its tokens.
19 The associated sentence type can be safely translated into English as “I am cold”.
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pw-truth-condition)? Or should he opt for “I am cold”, insisting that this is 
what the speaker literally means?
Recall that the pt-truth-condition of a sentence type U can be identified 
with the set of all (context, world) pairs at which a token of U can be truly 
uttered. And if it is this notion of truth condition that we want to preserve 
in our translation of sentence types, then surely “Mir ist kalt” needs to be 
tp-translated into “I am cold”. Nonetheless, some people may prefer that 
Johannes’ token of “Mir ist kalt” be tk-translated into John’s token of “He 
is cold” instead, as the two tokens happen to have the same pw-truth-condi-
tion. There is in fact no conflict between these two translations, because one 
is concerned with the translation of sentence types while the other is con-
cerned with the translation of sentence tokens. For the latter, we only require 
that the two particular tokens, possibly uttered in different contexts, are as-
sociated with the same set of possible worlds; for the former, however, we 
require that any two tokens of the two sentence types are associated with the 
same set of possible worlds, provided the tokens were uttered in the same 
context. Two tokens can tk-translate each other without the types to which 
they belong tp-translating each other. Similarly, two types can tp-translate 
each other without every pair of their tokens tk-translating each other.
It is important to note that once someone has adopted the restricted 
sense of translation between sentence tokens, he/she should no longer 
worry about the fact that “Mir ist kalt” and “He is cold” may have differ-
ent pw-truth-conditions in other contexts, for the sameness of pw-truth-
condition here has been claimed only for the two specific tokens of “Mir 
ist kalt” and “He is cold” in question. Similarly, if John chooses to trans-
late the token “Mir ist kalt” into his token “I am cold” type-theoretically, 
then he should not worry about the fact that his token fails to preserve the 
original pw-truth-condition of Johannes’ token. Because what he claims is 
not that “this token tk-translates that token”, but that “the type to which 
this token belongs tp-translates the type to which that token belongs”.
An interesting fact to observe here is that many translators prefer to 
do it the latter way – they expect the audience to understand the transla-
tion type-theoretically – and most people in the audience indeed have no 
difficulty understanding his/her token of “I am cold”; when uttered in the 
same context, a token of “Mir ist kalt” and a token of “I am cold” would 
have the same truth-value (or, in our terms, the same pw-truth-condition).
3. A Unified Thesis for the B-theory
Equipped with the notions defined in the preceding section, we may state 
the thesis of the B-theory of time as follows: the ch-meaning of a tensed 
sentence type can be completely described in terms of a tenseless pt-truth-
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condition. To be more specific, the ch-meaning of the sentence type “e is 
occurring now”, where for simplicity e is assumed to be an ideal event 
with no temporal duration,20 can be described by the following pt-truth-
condition:
[B-Thesis] Let u be any possible token of the type “e is occurring 
now”. Then, u is true iff the time of utterance of u equals 
that of e.21
This pt-truth-condition is “tenseless” in the sense that no tensed facts 
are referred to and no tensed phrases are employed in the thesis. Here 
we must keep in mind the point that the type “e is occurring now” is not 
“used” but only “mentioned”, in particular, the tensed phrase “is occurring 
now” is not being used here.
With regard to this formulation, we note that in the process of de-
scribing the meaning of a sentence type, there is no particular token that 
we need to pay special attention to. Rather, we have a variable “u” whose 
value runs through all possible tokens of the type. In other words, unlike 
some of the existing versions of the new B-theory, this B-thesis does not 
assume, on the left side of the “iff”, any information about the token u, 
such as the date of u or any property of it. Therefore, the tenseless criterion 
for the truth of the token u will have to be stated on the right side of “iff”, 
and this criterion should be stated in terms of some features of u – such as 
the time of utterance of u – that are essential for the determination of its 
truth value.
Note also that questions such as “Does the B-sentence really translate 
the A-sentence?”, “Does the B-sentence really have the same meaning 
as the A-sentence?” or “Does the B-sentence really have the same truth-
condition as the A-sentence?” are all meaningless here, because there is 
simply no well-formed B-sentence on the right side of the connective “iff” 
– the “u” here is merely a variable. The B-thesis in effect adopts a tense-
less meta-language to provide a ch-meaning for a tensed sentence type.
Let e be a given event, and P be the set of all possible tokens of the 
sentence type “e is occurring now”. Let t(x) denote the time of x, where 
20 Thanks are due to an anonymous referee who, in his comment on an earlier ver-
sion of this paper, reminded me that an event with temporal duration may incur further 
complications to the thesis.
21 Here, by one time “equaling” another I mean that, assuming a non-relativistic picture 
of space-time, the two times under consideration are the same, that is, the time t(u) of the 
token u and the time t(e) of the event e refer to the same temporal location. Later, I shall intro-
duce the identity symbol “=” to assert the identity of two times. I thank an anonymous referee 
for his comment on an earlier version of this paper, suggesting such a clarification of terms.
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x here can be either an event or a token. Then the B-thesis can be written 
symbolically as:
[B-Thesis] (symb) u [uP  (u is true iff t(u) = t(e))].22
The B-thesis can be further analyzed through the description of the cn-
meanings of the tokens. The cn-meaning of a sentence token u of “e is 
occurring now” is given by the following pw-truth-condition: for any pos-
sible world w in which u is tokened, u is true in w iff u is simultaneous 
with e in w. By specifying the pw-truth-condition for each token, the B-
thesis can then be spelled out in greater detail:





Here w stands for a possible world, and t
w
(x) denotes the time (or temporal 
location) of x in w.
We shall now see that, for the five existing versions of the B-theory, 
if one can suitably interpret – in terms of the terminology introduced in 
the previous section – the notions of “translation”, “meaning” and “truth 
condition”, then each of these can be regarded as but a particular way of 
presenting the same B-thesis.
3.1 The Old Date-analysis Version
As characterized by Quentin Smith in the Introduction to Part I of The 
New Theory of Time (Oaklander and Smith 1994: 18), the old tenseless 
theory of time
… is the theory that tensed sentences or tokens are translatable into tenseless 
sentences, and therefore that tensed sentences do not ascribe any temporal 
determinations not ascribed by tenseless sentences.
A typical claim of the old theory is the following thesis concerning the 
translatability of a tensed sentence into a tenseless one:
[Old Date-analysis] The sentence “e is occurring now”, tokened at t, 
                       can be translated into “e occurs at t”.
Evidently what the old theorist asserts here is, in our terms, the translat-
ability between two sentence tokens. And what governs this translatability 
is the sameness of cn-meanings, while the latter is in turn governed by the 
sameness of the associated pw-truth-conditions.
22 Note that here, instead of the material conditional , I use  to stand for the 
conditional “if… then…”, and instead of the material bi-conditional , I use “iff” to stand 
for the bi-conditional “if and only if”. This is to make it clear that the evaluation of such 
conditionals involves a set of possible worlds rather than just one world.
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Now, what is wrong with the old tenseless theory of time according to 
this interpretation? Nothing is wrong with it. The pw-truth-condition for 
the token “e is occurring now”, tokened at t, is indeed identical to that of a 
token “e occurs at t” uttered in any context. However, if this is indeed the 
case, why then is it that nearly everyone today thinks that the old theory 
should be abandoned? Let’s look at Mellor’s (1981: 78) reason for the 
failure of the old date-analysis version first:
… the truth conditions of tenseless sentences are not token-reflexive. No 
tenseless sentence, therefore, can have tokens whose truth conditions are 
everywhere and always the same as those of a tensed sentence, because, by 
definition, the latter vary from place to place or time to time, and the former 
do not. That is why no tenseless sentence can mean the same as the tensed 
one does.
What is Mellor’s claim here, in our terms? He is, in effect, saying that 
because tokens of a tensed sentence type may have different pw-truth-con-
ditions, while tokens of a tenseless sentence type may not, a tenseless sen-
tence type cannot translate a tensed sentence type. Clearly Mellor himself 
is confused and fails to distinguish between (a) the notion of translation 
between sentence tokens that was used in the thesis of the old theory, and 
(b) the notion of translation between sentence types which was employed 
by him to explain the failure of the old theory. Mellor is indeed right in 
claiming that the type “e occurs at t” does not tp-translate the type “e is 
occurring now”, as the tokens of the former all have the same pw-truth-
condition while those of the latter do not, yet this fact does not imply that 
the token “e is occurring now” tokened at t has a different pw-truth-condi-
tion from that of any token of “e occurs at t”, and it is this difference in 
pw-truth-conditions that is needed to refute the old theory.
Again, let P be the set of all possible tokens of the sentence type “e is 
occurring now” and t(x) be the time of x; then symbolically the old date-
analysis thesis can be charitably interpreted as:
[Old Date-analysis] (symb) Given that uP and t(u)=t, u can be 
                            tk-translated into “e occurs at t”.
One can either think of u as a particular token of interest to us, and re-
gard “uP and t(u)=t” as a presupposition; or one can think of “u” as a 
token variable which is governed by a universal quantifier u, and in this 
case “uP and t(u)=t” becomes the antecedent of a conditional. In either 
case, the tk-translatability is merely claimed for an instantiated token u, 
for which the assumption t(u)=t is indisputable.
In sum, if we are interested in the tp-translation of sentence types, then 
no tenseless sentence type can translate a tensed sentence type. However, 
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if the old tenseless theory of time is merely concerned with the tk-trans-
latability between a tensed token and a tenseless token, then inasmuch as 
the tokens under consideration indeed have the same pw-truth-condition, 
namely that the time t equals the time t(e) of e, the old date-analysis thesis 
can sustain itself by sticking to this restricted sense of translation. Further-
more, as, by assumption, the t here equals the time t(u) of the utterance of 
u, the pw-truth-condition is reduced to t(u)=t(e); therefore this version of 
the old theory can be seen as a special way of presenting the B-thesis.
3.2 The Old Token-reflexive Version
The other version of the old theory that we shall look at is:
[Old Token-reflexive] The sentence “e is occurring now” can be 
translated into “e is simultaneous with this 
utterance”.
Again, the old theorist here is claiming that a tensed sentence can be trans-
lated by a tenseless sentence. And once again, we need to decide whether 
he/she is talking about the translation of tokens or of types.
If it is tokens that this thesis is concerned with then, given any to-
ken of “e is occurring now”, its pw-truth is precisely that prescribed by 
a sentence “e is simultaneous with this utterance” uttered in the same 
context, and they tk-translate each other. Note that, however, unlike the 
date-analysis version discussed earlier, the context of the utterance of the 
tenseless token under consideration here matters, and if the context of 
the tenseless token is not specified as being identical to the context of the 
original tensed token then there is no point in asserting that the two tokens 
tk-translate each other.
If it is types that this thesis is talking about, then one has to make 
sure that “e is occurring now” and “e is simultaneous with this utterance” 
have the same ch-meaning so that they can translate each other. Accord-
ing to our notion of translatability between sentence types, two sentences 
tp-translate each other if and only if they have the same ch-meaning, and 
if and only if they have the same pt-truth-condition. Therefore, this ver-
sion of the old theory amounts to saying that, for any possible token u of 
the type “e is occurring now”, u is true iff any corresponding token v of 
“e is simultaneous with this utterance” uttered in the same context would 
have been true. The clause to the right of “iff” asserts that the time t(e) of e 
equals t(v) while presuming that the time t(v) of the token v equals the time 
t(u) of u. And it ends up yielding the same condition, namely t(u)=t(e), that 
is prescribed in the B-thesis.
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This token-reflexive version of the old-theory, nonetheless, faces the 
notorious problem of tokenless truth23 raised by the A-theorist. Consider 
the sentence “There is no utterance now”. The corresponding tenseless 
sentence is presumably “There is no utterance simultaneous with this ut-
terance”. Yet, according to the A-theorist, the former is possibly true while 
the latter is necessarily false: thus they have different meanings and cannot 
translate each other. This seemingly powerful argument has, together with 
Mellor’s concession of the failure of the other version of the old-theory, 
driven the B-theorist to abandon the old theory and to formulate a new 
B-theory of time. However, from a naturalistic viewpoint, the problem of 
tokenless truth poses no threat. As I have stressed earlier, the truth-value 
of the sentence type “There is no utterance now” makes sense only when 
the type is to be tokened. Thus, the A-theorist’s assumption that There is 
no utterance now may be true is simply groundless. On the one hand, if 
There is no utterance now is to be understood as a “thought” or a “propo-
sition”, then a well-defined notion of thought or proposition should be 
developed first; however, based on a naturalistic standpoint, we have not 
introduced and will not introduce such entities into our picture.24 On the 
other hand, if it is to be understood as a sentence type then, in order to be 
connected with the real world, it has to be tokened, but then any token of 
it is bound to be false.
Let P and t(x) be as before, and let Q be the set of all possible tokens 
of the sentence type “e is simultaneous with this token”; then the token-
reflexive version of the old theory can be expressed in our terms as
[Old Token-reflexive]   (symb) Given that uP, vQ, and t(u)=t(v), 
u can be tk-translated into v.
Here we note that the pw-truth-condition of v is governed by t(v)=t(e), 
which, when combined with the presupposition t(u)=t(v),25 yields t(u)=t(e), 
which is the same requirement as that for the B-thesis. Conversely, given 
the B-thesis, one finds that for any u and v satisfying the presupposition, u 
has the same cn-meaning as v, and they tk-translate each other. Therefore 
this version of the old theory can be seen as a special way of presenting 
the B-thesis.
Conceding that the translatability thesis of the old theory is at fault, 
instead of clarifying and charitably interpreting the notion of translation 
23 See Sattig (2006: 13–14) for instance.
24 It is the responsibility of those who envisage such entities to come up with precise 
definitions of them. But as none of them has so far made the effort to do so, we have no 
obligation to assume any understanding of these abstract entities.
25 Again, the presupposition t(u)=t(v) is indisputable.
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involved in the thesis as I just did, the B-theorists were quick to find a 
fallback position: despite the fact that tensed sentences or their tokens are 
not translatable into tenseless sentences,26 so far as the meaning of tensed 
sentences can be adequately captured by tenseless characterizations of the 
truth conditions of their tokens, the tenseless view stands. We shall ex-
amine the three main strands of the new B-theory in turn in the next three 
subsections.
3.3 The New Date-analysis Version (Smart)
J. J. C. Smart (1980) claims that the “truth condition” of a tensed sentence 
utterance can be given by
[New Date-analysis] Any token of “e is occurring now”, uttered at t, 
is true if and only if e occurs at t.
This departs from the old B-theory in that the tenseless clause “e occurs at 
t” on the right hand side of “if and only if” states the truth condition of the 
tensed token rather than translates it.
Now, how does this date-analysis thesis relate to our B-thesis? In the 
B-thesis we are considering all possible tokens, yet the date-analysis thesis 
here is seemingly concerned only with the set of possible tokens uttered at 
t. We can see the date-analysis thesis as an alternative form of presenting 
our B-thesis in two ways: 1) the “t” here is thought of as a proper name, 
and the date-analysis thesis is concerned with the set of possible tokens 
that are uttered at that particular time t; 2) the “t” here is a variable, and the 
date-analysis is in effect stratifying the set of possible tokens with time t.
In the first case, one is concerned with the set of possible tokens of 
“e is occurring now” uttered at a particular time t. This is analogous to the 
reduction of the B-thesis to the date-analysis version of the old theory, 
except that the new date-analysis thesis here is concerned with the set of 
possible tokens at t, while the old theory is only concerned with a particu-
lar token uttered at t. Nevertheless, so long as we are concerned only with 
tokens uttered at t, the pw-truth-condition for each u can still be described 
by “e occurs at t”, where t here simply denotes the time t(u), and there is 
no problem with this formulation.
In the second case, for any time t, we consider all possible tokens of 
“e is occurring now” uttered at t. In other words, at any given time t, t(u) 
equals t. As the time t varies, every possible token u will eventually be run 
through, and for each instance t, the analysis for the pw-truth-conditions of 
tokens uttered at t simply repeats that of the previous case.
26 See, for instance, Oaklander and Smith (1994).
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We can symbolize the latter interpretation as follows:27
[New Date-analysis] (symb)
ut [(uP & t(u)=t)  (u is true iff e occurs at t)].28
Note that “e occurs at t” can be written simply as t(e)=t.
This interpretation is essentially our B-thesis except that the definite 
description t(u) in the B-thesis is now presupposed to be co-referential 
with a referential expression t in the antecedent of the conditional. Fur-
thermore, u is a variable, and by “the truth condition” of a variable u we 
refer to the whole sentence starting with u in which “u is true” appears, 
rather than merely referring to t(e)=t.
We shall now briefly review a line of attack on this theory and some 
possible ways of defending the theory, and see how our interpretation of 
the thesis can help us resolve this debate. In the irrelevance-of-absolute-
location objection,29 Smith (1987) argues that Smart’s thesis is false, 
as there is some possible world w in which the utterance, say u, and e 
occur simultaneously (and thus in which u is true) but at some time t´ 
different from t. Therefore, e’s occurrence at t is not a necessary condi-
tion for the truth of u. In response to Smith’s attack, Oaklander suggests 
that to resolve the problem, one could require that the truth condition 
be world-indexed (Oaklander 1991). Smith then draws our attention to 
the fact that the world-indexing of the truth condition would lead to the 
following unwanted result30 (if Henry is indeed ill on 28 July 1940 in 
world w):
“Henry is ill” as spoken by John on 28 July 1940 in w is true in w if 
and only if the sun is 93 million miles from the earth in w.
In response to Smith’s complaint that the date-analysis theorist does not 
seem to be forthcoming on this matter,31 Mozersky (2001: 405) claims 
that “his argument fails if one allows that temporal indexicals such as 
‘now’ rigidly designate their time of utterance…”
27 When t is a constant, we get the reduced version u [(uP & t(u)=t)  (u is true 
iff t(e)= t)].
28 Hereafter we shall abuse notation by allowing t to stand for a time expression in 
English – our meta-language – as well as a constant (or variable) in the symbolic language, 
an object language. The story for u is similar.
29 I borrow Le Poidevin’s term; cf. Le Poidevin (2003).
30 See Smith (1994: 74) and Chapter 2 of Smith (1993).
31 In Smith (1999: 235), we find the following interesting passage: “I remain some-
what mystified as to why Mellor thinks the much-criticized date-analysis theory can be 
simply assumed (as he assumes it in Real Time II) without any attempt at an argumentative 
defense of this theory.”
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What can our interpretation of the date-analysis thesis say about 
Smith’s objection?
1) Take t to be a proper name. Call it t
0
 for clarity. Now, consider all 
possible tokens u of “e is occurring now” uttered at t
0
. Any token u 
uttered at t
0
 is true if and only if e occurs at t
0
, and so is any token 
of “e occurs at t
0
”. Thus they have the same pw-truth-condition. 
The reason Smith’s objection fails is that we are considering only 
those possible worlds for which the time of utterance of the tokens 
is t
0




)  ((u is true 




))], it is clear that possible worlds in which u is 
uttered at a time t´ different from t
0
 are simply not of interest to 
us here.
2) Take t to be a variable. The idea here is that the thesis is con-
cerned with the prescription of a “truth condition” for possible 
tokens of a tensed sentence type. The truth condition is prescribed 
by associating all possible tokens of this type with their respec-
tive truth-values. In this interpretation, not only do we not really 
have a token “e is occurring now” at hand, but the “t” is also not 
the proper name of a particular time. We should, as the subject 
of interest is a sentence type rather than a token of it, regard the 
terms for tokens and times that appear in the prescription of the 
truth condition as variables rather than proper names. With this 
understanding clearly in mind, all of Smith’s, Oaklander’s and 
Mozersky’s discussions can be easily seen to be missing the point. 
After all, if there is no token u and time t for us to start with, then 
it makes no sense to claim that “e’s occurrence at t is not a neces-
sary condition for the truth of u”. In fact, as t is itself a variable, “e 
occurs at t” is not even a well-formed sentence, as it is commonly 
thought to be.
It is worth noting that Dyke, an important figure in the B-camp, 
admits (see Dyke 2002) that the date-analysis version of the B-theory 
is unsatisfactory. In that paper, she first observes that if date expres-
sions of the date-analysis truth condition are definite descriptions of 
times, then Smith’s above-mentioned objection is valid, but if they are 
rather “names of times” then Smith’s argument fails.32 She then con-
cedes that Smith’s argument against this latter interpretation in Smith 
(1993) may succeed provided we allow Smith some crucial assumption, 
but claims later that “there is another, more decisive objection to the 
date theory”:
32 Note that here we understand the date expression t as either a proper name or a 
variable.
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If we let Sxy represent the relation “x is simultaneous with y”, Tx represent 
the predicate “x is true”, and e represent the event referred to by the sentence 
in question, the date theory can be written:
(1) For any token u of “The volcano is now erupting” uttered at t, u is true if 
and only if the volcano erupts simultaneously with t.
(1*) (u)(t)(Sut  (Tu Set)
(2) a uttered at t
1





  (Ta Set
1
)
The requirement of the date theory to specify the time of utterance in the 
statement of truth conditions results in the bi-conditional occurring as the 
consequent of another conditional. It follows that it is possible for the ante-
cedent of (2*) to be false and the consequent true, while the statement as a 
whole is true. (Dyke 2002: 335)
Dyke concludes that “date-involving truth conditions do not state the 
correct truth condition for tensed sentences, since they leave it open for 
the tensed token to be true while the appropriate relation between the 
token and the date specified does not obtain” (Dyke 2002: 336). What 
can we say about Dyke’s analysis? I think Dyke here is guilty of trans-
lating the innocent statement (2) into some (2*) which fails to capture 
the meaning of (2), and then attributing the failure of (2*) to that of the 
date version.
Adopting the terminology we have introduced earlier, we can inter-
pret Dyke’s (2) in the following four ways:
 (i) Both “a” and “t
1
” are proper names
In this case, (2) presupposes that a is actually uttered at t
1
, in 
other words, for a token a uttered at some time different from t
1
, 
(2) simply makes no sense.33 The correct symbolization of (2) 
should then simply be “Ta iff Set
1
”, meaning that the pw-truth-
condition of the token a uttered at t
1 




(ii) “a” is a variable while “t
1
” is a proper name
In this case, (2) is concerned with the truth of possible tokens 
of “The volcano is now erupting” uttered at a particular time t
1
. 
The correct symbolization of (2) is then (u) (Sut
1
  (Tu iff Set
1
). 
Note that “a”, as a variable, has been replaced by the dummy 
index “u”.
33 For instance, the sentence beginning “The ‘I have a dream’ token of Martin Luther 
King uttered in the year 2000 is true if and only if…” is simply incomprehensible.
26 Prolegomena 10 (1) 2011
(iii) “a” is a proper name while “t
1
” is a variable
In this case, (2) is concerned with the truth of a token of “The 
volcano is now erupting” whose time of utterance is unknown. 
The correct symbolization of (2) is then (t) (Sat  (Ta iff Set). 
Here, t
1
 has been replaced by the dummy index “t”.
(iv) Both “a” and “t
1
” are variables
In this case, (2) should be translated into (u)(t)(Sut  (Tu iff Set), 
which is similar to Dyke’s (1*), except that I have used  and 
“iff” instead of   and  to make it clear that there is one further 
level of quantification that has not been spelled out, namely the 
quantification over possible worlds. When it is written out in full, 







stead of Dyke’s (1*).
Apparently, none of these interpretations suffers from the problem 
that Dyke indicates. I think the main reason that the A-theorist and some 
of the B-theorists, such as Dyke, are led to the conclusion that date-analy-
sis is problematic is this: the role that some presupposition – a stipulated 
relation between the token and the time under consideration – plays in the 
date-analysis thesis has been overlooked.
The statement of the date-analysis thesis – namely, any token of “e is 
occurring now”, tokened at t, is true if and only if e occurs at t – does not 
care about the cases for which the time of the token t(u) differs from the 
date t specified. Thus there is no point in conceiving, as Smith is fond of 
doing in Smith (1993), ad hoc possible worlds in which a token u of “e is 
occurring now” is true (because it is simultaneous with e), yet the time of u 
(and of e) is different from the date t. In logical terms, we can say that the 
quantification over possible worlds lies within the scope of quantification 
over tokens and dates, and the clause “token u is uttered at date t in world 
w” can be found in the antecedent of the main conditional.
3.4 The New Token-reflexive Theory (Mellor)
In Real Time, Mellor presents a token-reflexive version of the new tense-
less theory of time which can be summed up by the following thesis:
[New Token-reflexive] Any token u of “e is occurring now” is true if and 
only if u is simultaneous with e.
This token-reflexive version of the B-theory differs from our B-thesis only 
in that, on the right side of “if and only if”, it has “u is simultaneous with 
e”; in the B-thesis we have t(u)=t(e), where t(u) and t(e) stand for the time 
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of utterance of u and the time of e respectively. Indeed, t(u)=t(e) can be 
seen as a rephrasing or an explanation of “u is simultaneous with e”. The 
reason we prefer to write t(u)=t(e) is to make it clear that the information 
relevant to the truth of u is the time of its utterance and the time of e. This, 
however, does not mean that we need to know the exact dates of u and e 
in order to know the truth of u. What is essential in order for us to know 
the truth of u is that we have a way to compare the temporal locations of 
the two.
The u here, again, can play either the role of a constant or that of a 
variable. When u is taken to be the name of a particular token, the token-
reflexive thesis asserts that u has the same pw-truth-condition as “t(u)= 
t(e)”, which in turn has the same pw-truth-condition as a token v of “e is 
simultaneous with this utterance” uttered in the same context as u; this is 
because t(v)=t(u) would make t(u)=t(e) and t(v)=t(e) equivalent, and we 
then would get the old token-reflexive version. And if we let t denote the 
time t(u), then the pw-truth-condition can be described by any token of “e 
occurs at t”, and we then get the old date-analysis version.
If, on the other hand, u is taken to be a variable, then the pt-truth-
condition of u associates the truth of u with the truth of “u is simultaneous 
with e” and the latter can again be described in our terms as t(u)=t(e), 
where t(e) here refers to the time of a special event e, and the token- re-
flexive version can again be thought of as a presentation of our B-thesis. 
Nevertheless, the sentence type “e is occurring now” cannot be “trans-
lated” by “t(u)=t(e)”, because the latter is not a well-defined sentence at 
all – it involves an unbound variable u.
We then get:
[New Token-reflexive] (symb)
u [uP  (u is true iff t(u)=t(e))].
Note that according to this interpretation, the new token-reflexive version 
is precisely the B-thesis that was introduced at the very beginning of the 
present section.
Now we need to consider Smith’s two main objections34 to the token-
reflexive version of the new B-theory.
34 It is, however, a third issue brought out by Smith in Chapter 3 of Smith (1993) that 
has forced Mellor to concede that the token-reflexive theory has been successfully refuted. 
Mellor (1998: 34) admitted that “‘There are no tokens now’ refutes all token-reflexive ac-
counts, A- and B- alike, of what makes A-propositions true.” However, as I have remarked 
in subsection 2.1, we can disregard this problem based on the realistic requirement that we 
only talk about truth-values for sentence tokens.
28 Prolegomena 10 (1) 2011
1. The Inconsistency Objection
Smith claims that Mellor’s theory is self-contradictory. He proceeds 
roughly as follows. On the one hand, Mellor admits that the truth condi-
tions of tensed sentences are different from those of tenseless sentences 
– thus his call for a new theory. On the other hand, Mellor’s account does 
imply that they have the same truth condition – thus the contradiction. 
Consider, for instance, a token U of “It is now 1980”. According to Mellor, 
the sentence token U is true if and only if it occurs in 1980. Now consider 
another token T of  “U occurs in 1980”, whose truth condition is evidently 
that U occurs in 1980. Do U and T then have the same truth condition? 
From,
(1) U is true if and only if U occurs in 1980, and
(2) T is true if and only if U occurs in 1980,
we seem to have an affirmative answer to this question. But then, ac-
cording to Smith, Mellor is again picking up the old theory that he has 
abandoned, namely that U and T have the same meaning and thus translate 
each other. If he claims that he is actually proposing a new theory, he falls 
into a self-contradiction.
What can we say about Smith’s charge? In our terms, it is clear that 
what Mellor claims in this version of the new theory is that U, as a par-
ticular token, has the same pw-truth-condition as T. However, when he 
abandons the old theory, he is observing that the ch-meaning of the type 
“It is now 1980” described by (1), i.e. the pt-truth-condition of a token U, 
is different from the ch-meaning of the type “U occurs in 1980” described 
by (2), i.e. the pt-truth-condition of T – because the truth of U is token-
dependent but the truth of T is not. To be more precise, the pt-truth-condi-
tions of U and T are given by (1)´ and (2)´ respectively, meaning that they 
are different pt-truth-conditions.35
(1)´ Any token U (of “It is now 1980”) is true if and only if U occurs 
in 1980,
(2)´ Any token T (of “U occurs in 1980”) is true if and only if U oc-
curs in 1980.
Note that (2)´ does not make sense if the “U” is considered to be an 
unbound variable, as that would be analogous to saying that a token T of 
“x is a bachelor” is true iff x is a bachelor, without quantifying over the 
variable x, i.e. the x in sight is only mentioned rather than used. Therefore, 
35 For a pt-truth-condition, we need to consider (1)´ as a whole rather than look only 
at the right hand side of the “if and only if”. The case for (2)´ is similar.
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we should see the quantification over T as being inside the scope of a 
quantification over U. To be more specific, (2)´ can be seen as merely a 
copy of the underlined consequent that lies within
U (U is a token of “It is now 1980”  T [T is a token of “U occurs 
in 1980” (T is true iff U occurs in 1980)]).
At each instance of the quantification, U takes as its value a particular 
token of “It is now 1980”. Once U represents a particular token of “It is 
now 1980”, the pt-truth-condition for a token T of “U occurs in 1980” 
becomes a constant function (that is, a token-independent function) from 
possible tokens of “U occurs in 1980” to truth values, and the truth-value 
is determined by whether the U indeed occurs in 1980.
There is hence no inconsistency here. In sum, if “U” and “T” are 
taken to be proper names (token constants) of particular sentence tokens, 
and what Smith has in mind are their pw-truth-conditions, then U and T 
do have the same “truth condition”. And the two tokens “translate” each 
other, at the token level, as they have the same pw-truth-condition that U 
occurs in 1980. However, this is consistent with Mellor’s worry about the 
old B-theory: when “U” and “T” are thought of as token variables of their 
respective types, they do not share the same pt-truth-condition. Basically, 
Smith is confusing two notions of truth conditions: the pt-truth-condition 
that is essential for determining the tp-translatability of sentence types, 
and the pw-truth-condition that accounts for the inter-translatability of two 
tokens uttered in certain contexts.
Note that Oaklander has a similar reply to Smith’s objection. Oak-
lander (1991: 30) suggests that “there is no inconsistency in claiming 
that tensed and tenseless sentence types have tokens with different truth 
conditions, while also claiming that tensed and tenseless sentence tokens 
themselves have the same truth conditions”. By resorting to a passage 
from Real Time, in which Mellor claims that the truth-conditions of the 
tokens of a tensed sentence also vary, Smith seems to have successfully re-
buked Oaklander’s defense of Mellor. But it is not so,36 as evidently what 
Oaklander has in mind here is the pw-truth-condition of a constant token, 
while what Smith’s Mellor is concerned with is the pt-truth-condition of a 
variable token,37 and there is nothing incompatible here.
36 I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for asking me to clarify this point.
37 Paul (1997) mentions in a footnote that David Lewis suggested a resolution of 
Mellor’s problem along this line of taking tokens as variables. But she did not explore it 
further.
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2. Failure of the Logical Entailment Objection
Smith claims that the token-reflexive truth conditions of sentence tokens 
are incapable of explaining logical entailments between tensed sentences. 
Consider, in addition to a token U of “It is now 1980”, another token V of 
“1980 is present”. According to Smith, clearly U logically entails V. How-
ever, according to Mellor, the truth conditions of U and V are U occurs in 
1980 and V occurs in 1980 respectively, and it is not at all clear how these 
truth conditions are to be related to each other. Smith’s objection can be 
summed up as
Premise 1. Logically, U and V entail each other, where
U is a token of “It is now 1980” and V is a token of “1980 is 
present”.
Premise 2. Yet they have different truth conditions, as
(&) U is true if and only if U occurs in 1980;
(@) V is true if and only if V occurs in 1980.
Therefore, their truth conditions cannot explain the entailment rela-
tionship between the two.
Oaklander’s (1991) reply is that U and V indeed have the same truth 
condition, as for both of them the token is true iff the year of its utterance 
is 1980. However, as Smith (1994) insists, once the occurrences of “it” 
are replaced by the names of the relevant tokens, the appearance that they 
have the same truth condition vanishes. L. A. Paul takes sides with Smith 
on this matter (cf. Paul 1997).
Now we shall see how this objection of Smith can be resolved in our 
terms.38 As always, we need to be clear about what sorts of entities we 
take U and V to be.
Firstly, we can choose to regard “U” and “V” merely as two particular 
tokens uttered in certain contexts in space-time. In this case, there is no 
ground for us to say that they logically entail each other. This can be seen 
as follows. If we arbitrarily choose a token U and a token V so that at least 
one of them, U say, is true, then chances are that the other, i.e. V, is not true. 
Without requiring that the token V be uttered in the same context as U, the 
probability that it is uttered at the same time as U is zero, and so long as U 
and V are not uttered at the same time, their respective pw-truth-conditions 
are different. Therefore, there is no reason why the pw-truth-conditions 
38 The reader is also referred to Mozersky (2000), Mozersky (2001), Dyke (2002) 
and Dyke (2003) for similar yet different ways of replying to Smith’s objections to the 
new B-theory.
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of these two particular tokens U and V should be the same. Thus, Smith’s 
first promise is false, and this is by all means consistent with the fact that 
his second premise may be true under this interpretation.39
Secondly, we can choose to regard “U” and “V” as two token vari-
ables and talk about the logical equivalence of the types to which they 
respectively belong. According to this interpretation, it is the types “It is 
now 1980” and “1980 is present” that are logically equivalent to each 
other, in the sense that they have the same pt-truth-condition. In other 
words, any token x of either type is true iff x is in 1980,40 where the “x” 
here plays the role of a token variable rather than that of a token constant. 
And Smith was misled by the prima facie difference of his so-called “truth 
conditions” of U and V, which appear on the right hand sides of (&) and 
(@), when he concluded that these truth conditions are different. As I have 
emphasized earlier, the pt-truth-condition of a token variable U is given 
by (&) as a whole – unless paired with the clause on the left hand side of 
(&), the “truth condition” “U occurs in 1980” is simply meaningless. Thus 
premise 2 fails and Smith’s objection does not hold.
3.5 The Sentence-type Version (Paul)
L. A. Paul concedes (see Paul 1997) that indeed a token-reflexive truth 
condition cannot explain the logical equivalence of “It is now 1980” and 
“1980 is present”. She even provides an example to further illustrate this 
point: “It is now 1997” logically implies “1996 is past”, yet the tokening 
of the former does not imply the tokening of the latter, and therefore the 
entailment relation is not explained. She observes however that:
… the truth conditions of the types are that “It is now 1997” is true iff the 
time of its context of evaluation is 1997, and that “1996 is past” is true iff 
the time of its context of evaluation is later than 1996. The truth conditions 
together with our definition of entailment explain the entailment relation, 
since a context with a time of 1997 is by definition a context with a time that 
is later than 1996, and so when “It is now 1997” is true, “1996 is past” must 
also be true. (Paul 1997: 64)
She then proposes a third version of the new tenseless theory in which 
the analysis of truth conditions is done for sentence types instead of sen-
39 If we are forced to consider the case where the two tokens U and V happen to be 
tokened at the same time, then Premise 2 fails.
40 We have something like this: for any token U of “It is now 1980” and any token 
V of “1980 is present” uttered in the same context, U is true iff U is in 1980, and iff V is 
in 1980, and iff V is true. Note that again there is no particular token constant in question 
here. Both “U” and “V” play the role of a token variable rather than the role of a token 
constant.
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tence tokens. Moreover, to meet the “there are no tokens now” challenge,41 
she brings contexts instead of tokens into play.42 The main thesis of her 
account is
[Sentence-type] For any context c, the sentence type “e is occurring 
now” is true with respect to c if and only if e is oc-
curring in c.
By making it explicit that, in the prescription of a truth condition, 
the subject under consideration is a sentence type rather than a sentence 
token, Paul’s thesis has greatly reduced the chance that the reader will be 
misled by the word “token” – which features heavily in the previous two 
versions of the new B-theory – into thinking that she/he has two particular 
tokens at hand. As remarked by Smith (1999: 234), “Paul avoids sentence 
tokens and thus does not run into the above-discussed problems about the 
relations of sentence tokens to times, events or other sentence tokens.” 
Indeed, Smith acknowledges that
L. A. Paul has formulated a third and novel “sentence-type” version of the 
tenseless theory that she shows escapes the problems with the two traditional 
versions of tensed sentences, and argues that her new account escapes the 
criticisms put forth in Smith (1987, 1993), in Oaklander and Smith (1994) 
and elsewhere. I agree that her new theory escapes these criticisms, but I 
also believe there is a new set of criticisms that her theory does not escape. 
(Smith 1999: 233)
Smith’s criticism is mainly based on a tenser’s attempt to introduce tensed 
truth conditions into Paul’s thesis. According to Smith, if a token of the 
“event-type” Jane having nightmares occurred last night at 11 p.m., then 
the sentence type “Jane’s nightmares are presently occurring” is not now 
true with respect to last night, since last night is no longer presently occur-
ring, and thus this context fails to include a condition (presently occurring) 
specified by the sentence type. Basically, in saying that a certain present-
tense sentence type S is true with respect to a certain context c, Smith asks 
us to see the “is” as an is (present tense) rather than an is (tenseless).43 
Thus Paul’s context c should include the exemplification of the A-property 
of presentness for S to be (present tense) true with respect to c. However 
Paul, as a detenser, simply has no obligation to follow Smith’s lead and 
reply to his criticism.
41 See Chapter 3 of Smith (1993).
42 Note that a token variable in our sense runs through, in effect, all “possible contexts 
of use” in Montague’s terms, cf. Montague (1974), and I see no reason to abandon the us-
age of tokens in our account, as Paul apparently did in her theory.
43 See MacFarlane (2003) for an elaborate discussion of the distinction between a 
context of utterance and a context of evaluation.
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Anticipating a reaction of this sort, Smith claims that if one insists on 
a tenseless evaluation of a sentence type with respect to a context, then
…the original intent of her new and “third” version of the tenseless theory of 
time is lost. With this change to her theory, “the time of the evaluation of the 
sentence-type” plays the same logical role as “the time at which the token of 
the sentence-type occurs” and this not only vitiates Paul’s project of formu-
lating truth condition sentences that do not refer to tokens (or their logical 
analogues, such as evaluations of a sentence-type), but also encounters the 
standard problems of the token-reflexive and date-analysis versions of the 
tenseless theory of time. (Smith 1999: 243)
Smith then brings to bear on this third version the same criticisms he 
has used with the previous two versions of the new theory. Smith finds 
that Paul’s formulation of the sentence-type theory is a perfect place to 
introduce into the picture, on the one hand, a “context of evaluation” 
which, according to Paul, can be directly specified by the phrase “with 
respect to” – rather than having to be determined by the utterance of a 
token – and, on the other hand, an “is” that is always in the present tense. 
And these allow him to turn Paul’s theory into an A-flavored theory. But 
once it becomes clear that Paul need not buy Smith’s A-theoretical inter-
pretation, he insists that a tenseless reading of her theory can simply be 
reduced to the previous versions of the new theory and cannot withstand 
his attacks.
In effect, Smith leaves Paul with two choices: either she accepts his 
A-theory-flavored truth-condition, or she returns to the two versions of 
the new theory that she has already abandoned. Either way means that 
Paul’s new B-theory fails. I agree with Smith that if Paul refuses to ac-
cept his A-interpretation of her account, then her account is not much 
different from the two versions that she has abandoned. However, what 
we have been doing in the preceding subsections is precisely to give, 
through the formulation of a unified B-thesis, new insights into the two 
existing versions of the B-theory so that they can withstand Smith’s at-
tacks.
What can we say about Paul’s theory then? First of all, it succeeds 
in reminding us that in the business of providing tenseless truth condi-
tions for tensed sentences, the true subject of concern is a sentence type 
rather than a sentence token. Secondly, Paul overdoes it to the extent that 
she completely throws out the notion of “tokens” though this is a perfect 
tool to help us pin down the meaning of a sentence type. She introduces a 
“context of evaluation” c into her picture, and asks one to add the phrase 
“with respect to c” in order to evaluate a sentence type. The problem, 
however, is this: given a context c, how are we supposed to evaluate the 
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very statement that appears on the left hand side of the bi-conditional in 
Paul’s thesis,44 namely,
The sentence type “e is occurring now” is true with respect to c.
Is it really the sentence type “e is occurring now” that we are evaluat-
ing here? Or are we here concerned with a token of it that is uttered now, 
while the verb “is” in question is in the present tense? Smith has tried his 
best to force the latter interpretation upon the reader, but we have seen 
that we need not grant him this A-theoretic interpretation. In any case, it 
remains unclear as to how Paul is to make sense of the “true with respect 
to c” without telling people how the context of evaluation c is to be intro-
duced into this picture and be related to the sentence type, so that the task 
of determining the truth value can be carried out. So far as I can see, and 
Smith (1999) thinks this is plausible, the most natural way to relate c to a 
sentence type is to let it be the context of a possible token u of the type. 
Then Paul’s thesis reduces to
[Sentence-type] (symb)
c [(u is uttered in c and uP)  (u is true iff t(u)=t(e))].
Note that in the antecedent of the main conditional, u is described as a 
possible token of “e is occurring now” uttered in context c, and thus the 
time of the context t(c) is the same as the time of the token t(u). It is clear 
then that the quantification c can simply be replaced by u, and then the 
thesis becomes u [uP  (u is true iff t(u)=t(e))], which is nothing but 
the B-thesis.
In sum, as Smith rightly observes, if one insists on a tenseless evalu-
ation of a sentence type with respect to a context, then there need to be 
some token-like entities that can relate the type to the context of its evalu-
ation, and, without the introduction of a “Now” into the picture, there is 
simply no point in distinguishing between a context of utterance of a type 
and a context of evaluation of it. And in that case, we may as well simply 
grant the tokens of a sentence type the role that they have been playing 
in the earlier two versions of the B-theory – as fixing both the context of 
utterance and the context of evaluation. Paul (1997: 63) stresses that “it 
should be possible to evaluate whether or not a type is true with respect to 
a context without requiring that tokens of the type be produced in that con-
text”, and that therefore the problem that “No tokens are being produced 
now” can be solved more easily in her account. However, I maintain that 
Paul’s mechanism for specifying a context for the sentence type is mys-
44 Certainly we cannot just say that the truth condition is determined by “e is occur-
ring in c”, as this would simply make Paul’s thesis a trivial statement. Rather, it has to be 
given an independent truth condition.
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terious, unless by “with respect to c” she merely means “when tokened at 
c”, and so far as I can see, the latter is the only realistic way in which a 
sentence type could become incarnated in the world.
Indeed, Paul’s notion of a context and my notion of a token are not the 
same thing – the latter preserves the information about the type while the 
former does not. But what is essential for a tenseless theory of time is the 
prescription of meanings for tensed sentence types. The variable introduced 
into the pt-truth-condition statement, be it a context variable or a token var-
iable, plays only an auxiliary role in helping us to pin down the ch-meaning 
of a sentence type. As I have explained, so far as each token-denoting term 
“u” that is involved in a truth condition statement is handled with care, ei-
ther as a token constant or as a token variable, all of Smith’s objections to 
the earlier versions of the new B-theory can be successfully resolved.
4. Conclusion
Over the past few decades the B-theorists of time have come up with many 
versions of the B-theory, each of which has received attacks and criticisms 
from both the A-camp and the B-camp. One reason that some of the B-
theorists have subsequently failed to defend their theses is that, misled 
by some A-theorists, they have taken a token variable u to be a token 
constant, or taken a date variable t to be a date constant, without replacing 
the notion of pt-truth-conditions with that of pw-truth-conditions. If one 
can stick to the principle that every notion involved in the statement of 
the B-thesis needs to be carefully defined and carefully used, and that due 
care needs to be given to distinguishing variables from constants, then the 
resulting B-thesis as described in this paper can withstand and indeed can 
resolve all previous attacks leveled by the A-theorist.
Specifically, we have demonstrated in the previous section that all 
the five main strands of the B-theory of time can be seen as special ways 
of presenting the same B-thesis, and with their respective theses suitably 
interpreted, they can all withstand the A-attacks. According to the analysis 
in the last section, we can group the five existing versions of the tenseless 
theory into the following two theses:
 u [uP  (u is true iff t(u) = t(e))]
– Old token-reflexive, New token-reflexive, and Sentence-type
 ut [(uP & t(u)=t)  (u is true iff t(e)= t)]
– Old date-analysis and New date-analysis
And it is a simple exercise in logic to show that the second thesis is logi-
cally equivalent to the first. Thus we reach the unified B-thesis
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[B-Thesis] (symb) u [uP  (u is true iff t(u) = t(e))].
Furthermore, by specifying how possible worlds fit into this picture, 
we get the detailed version of the B-thesis45
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